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I am glad to be here not only to deliver the John A. Sibley Lecture
in Law but also to participate in the ceremonies connected with the
dedication of the Dean Rusk Center for International and Compara-
tive Law.***
Dean Rusk is not only a great citizen of Georgia, but also a great
citizen of the United States and of the world. Among United States
statesmen he distinguishes himself by his appreciation of the im-
portance of the United Nations and the need for the United States
to play a leading role in this town meeting of the world. His wisdom
and kindness are highly appreciated by all of us who have the privi-
lege of knowing him. Our paths crossed some thirty years ago, and
over the years we have met- many times as our interests were similar:
the United Nations,' human rights,' and arms control and disarma-
* The first John A. Sibley Lecture in Law for the academic year 1977-78, delivered at the
University of Georgia School of Law on October 27, 1977.
** Bemis Professor of International Law, Harvard University Law School.
*** The Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law was founded in 1977
to facilitate greater efficiency in interactions between business and government activities and
between various government activities. The Center works closely with a broad range of busi-
ness and government entities at the local, state, federal, and international levels to (1)
identify specific government-business interactions directly or indirectly affecting interna-
tional trade and investment that involve unnecessary burdens on business or governmental
interests, (2) mobilize university, business, and government resources to develop both theo-
retical and practical approaches that will substantially reduce such burdens, and (3) facili-
tate the implementation of such approaches by providing business and government entities
with some essential informational and manpower resources.
I "[Tihe attempt to develop law and a peaceful world order constitutes a necessary ele-
ment in United States policy. These are essential goals of the United Nations as well."
Statement by Dean Rusk (Mar. 7, 1967), 56 DEP'T STATE BULL. 602 (1967). See also Charter
Day Address by Dean Rusk (Mar. 20, 1961), 44 id. 516-17 (1961); D. RUSK, THE Wisps OF
FREEDOM 301 (1963); The Role of International Law in World Affairs, Address by Dean Rusk
(Nov. 17, 1964), 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 802-03 (1964).
See, e.g., Freedom and Development, Address by Dean Rusk (Sept. 25, 1964), 51
DEP'T STATE BULL. 498-501 (1964); Interview with Dean Rusk (Sept. 7, 1965), 53 id. 510
(1965); The Common Quest for Freedom and Development in the American Republics, Ad-
dress by Dean Rusk (Nov. 23, 1965), id. at 990-91; RUSK, Introduction, 7 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 219-21 (1977).
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ment.3 His many speeches on these subjects always struck a positive
note, thus appealing strongly to people interested in world peace
and order.
In 1965, when I had the pleasure of introducing him at the Annual
Dinner of the American Society of International Law, I pointed out
that Dean Rusk has listed four principal commitments of the United
States in the field of foreign policy: to the United Nations, to the
growth of law among nations, to freedom, and to economic and
social advancement.4 As Dean Rusk said on that occasion, the
United States seeks "a world of expanding human rights and well-
being . . . a world of expanding international law." And he added:
"If once the rule of law could be discussed with a certain condescen-
sion as a Utopian ideal, today it becomes an elementary practical
necessity. Pacta sunt servanda now becomes the basis for survival."
In the same speech he pointed out that the "'common law of man-
kind' . . . is growing as the world shrinks" and that the rapid "pace
of discovery and invention forces us to reach out for international
agreement, to build international institutions, to do things in ac-
cordance with an expanding international and transnational law."5
In the last few years, Dean Rusk and I have been again working
together to build international institutions in the complex area of
the law of the sea, trying to develop a new international regime for
the two-thirds of the surface of the earth which is covered by
oceans.' And in his prophetic fashion already in 1962 Dean Rusk
listed among the problems of the 21st Century: desalinization of
ocean waters; enabling deserts to bloom; cultivation of crops in the
sea; and the mining of mineral nodules on the ocean floor.'
Coming now to the main subject of my Sibley lecture, I plan to
consider here the ways by which the international community is
shaping international law, and in particular the methods used by
See, e.g., Charter Day Address by Dean Rusk, supra note 1, at 517-18; D. RUSK, supra
note 1, at 257, 267; Remarks by Dean Rusk (Dec. 1, 1965), 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 982-83 (1965);
The Political Future of the Family of Man, Address by Dean Rusk (Nov. 14, 1967), 57 id.
737-38 (1967).
Remarks by L.B. Sohn (April 24, 1965), reprinted in [1965] PRoc. OF THE AM. Soc'Y OF
INT'L L. 245, 246 (1965).
1 Address by the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State (April 24, 1965), id. at 247, 248-
49, 254, 255 (hereinafter cited as Address by Dean Rusk (April 24, 1965)].
1 From 1974 to 1976 Dean Rusk was the chairman of the Advisory Committee on the Law
of the Sea, and Louis B. Sohn was a member of that Committee, with special responsibility
for the settlement of law of the sea disputes.
New Frontiers of Science, Space, and Foreign Policy: Address by the Honorable Dean
Rusk on the Occasion of International Law Day at the World's Fair, Seattle, Washington
(May 25, 1962), reprinted in 46 DEP'T STATE BULL. 931 (1962).
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the United Nations to build-to use another one of Dean Rusk's
favorite phrases-"a decent world order."
8
There is no special mystery about the shaping of international
law. The forces that help to shape that legal system are not too
different from those which influence the development of the law in
the United States, whether on the federal or the state level. In each
community; local, national or international, there are some groups
which exercise special influence on the legal process, there are oth-
ers who have some amount of influence, and then there is the vast
majority which can exercise its influence only periodically through
the electoral process. In the international community there are a few
States which play an important role in the shaping of international
law, there are some twenty or thirty others which act as leaders of
various groups, and there are more than one hundred States which
simply follow their leaders to protect regional or other special inter-
ests. Again, as in the national domain, this is not as simple as it may
appear. The major powers seldom act together, are often on the
opposite sides of a dispute, and each of them tries to build a coali-
tion of various groups to achieve the necessary law-making majority.
Similarly, the interests of other countries often transcend ordinary
regional or other special bonds, and to achieve a goal their leaders
need to form temporary coalitions which soon split when new issues
arise. Sometimes the dominant factor is political or ideological, on
other occasions it is economic or even cultural. The predominance
of the English and French languages in many countries of Africa,
Asia, and the Caribbean, together with various cultural and educa-
tional links with London and Paris, are not negligible factors in
international affairs.
While the main lines of confrontation are between the capitalist
or semi-socialist West and the communist East, and between the
developed North and the developing South, there are many other
possible lines of division. For instance, in the law of the sea there is
a split between major maritime powers (including not only the
United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, but also Greece, Lib-
eria, and Panama) and the coastal States (including not only most
Latin American States but also Canada, Norway, and Iceland);
and, in addition, between the coastal States and the landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged States (such as Bolivia, Nepal, and
Singapore). There are also other special-interest groups, such as
Address by Dean Rusk (April 24, 1965), supra note 5, at 255.
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archipelagic States, countries bordering on international straits,
and small island States. Superimposed on these groups are divisions
based on regional lines, the various economic interests (e.g., fishing,
mining, or oil exploitation), and such ideological factors as the sup-
port for or opposition to the New International Economic Order.,
The shaping of international law is complicated further by the
sudden growth of the international community. It was easier to
codify international law when at the first Hague Conference in 1899
most participants were from Europe, and invitations were extended
to only a few States from other parts of the world.'0 The inclusion
of a larger number of non-European States in the Second Hague
Conference led to various difficulties and prevented an agreement
on an international court." Only a few States, mostly in Eastern
Europe, were added to the international community during the
League of Nations period, and the United Nations started with
merely fifty-one members. But during the last twenty years the
membership of the United Nations almost tripled, and there are in
it 149 States, leaving only a few States outside.'"
One can compare this revolution in the structure of the interna-
tional community with the addition of the Third Estate to the Bri-
The New International Economic Order is strongly supported by the so-called Group of
77 (by now including more than 110 developing States), and is opposed by the Western
industrial powers. The aspirations of the Group of 77 are embodied in the Declaration and
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.
Res. 3201 and 3202, S-6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), and the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
,1 Only the following non-European States took part in that Conference: China, Japan,
Mexico, Persia, Siam, Turkey, and the United States. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCES, THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, 1-7 (J.B. Scott ed. 1920).
" In addition to those who took part in 1899, the following non-European States partici-
pated in the 1907 Conference: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Uru-
guay, and Venezuela. 1 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, THE CONFERENCE
OF 1907, 2-15 (J.B. Scott ed. 1920). As the list indicates, all the new participants were Latin
American States. With respect to the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, see M.O. HUDSON,
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at 80-84 (1943); Myers, The
Composition of the Court, [1913] PRoC. OF THE AM. Soc'Y FOR JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INT'L
DISPUTrES 153-71 (1914).
"1 The following States are not members of the United Nations: Switzerland, the two
Koreas, and such small States as Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Monaco. In addition to
Rhodesia and Namibia, there are more than twenty non-self-governing territories, several of
which are likely to become members of the United Nations. Report of the Special Committee
on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 23), U.N. Doc.
A/10023/Rev. 1 (1976).
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tish and French Parliaments, 3 to the profound changes brought by
the British electoral reforms in 1832, 1 or to the abolition of poll
taxes and other voting restrictions and inequities in the United
States. ' This enfranchisement of almost one hundred new States
has certainly changed the balance of power in the forces which
shape international law. Whichever factors one considers-number
of States, population, or economic power-there has been a tremen-
dous shift of power from the industrial West to the other parts of
the world, especially the populous countries of Asia, the oil-rich
countries of the Middle East, and the numerous countries of Africa.
No group or even combination of groups can now dominate the law-
making process; law can no longer be imposed on a dissenting group;
and most problems have to be solved by patient negotiations leading
to a broad consensus.
Consequently, it is important for all groups of countries, espe-
cially the older democracies of the West and all those small coun-
tries which can find protection from their powerful neighbors only
in an adequate system of legal norms and institutions, to start pay-
ing more attention to the old and new ways of shaping international
," The Third Estate was the professional class ("probi viri") which in the 14th and 15th
centuries became established as a separate order distinct from the lay and clerical nobility.
In the feudal hierarchy, only the latter two groups were in direct correspondence with the
monarch. In 1301 and 1302 Phillip the Fair of France summoned all three groups to give
counsel. This is usually regarded as the beginning of the Estates General, the forerunner of
the modem legislative assembly. For an account of the early development of the representa-
tive legislature in England and France, see 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY 665-95 (J.R.
Tanner, C.W. Previt6-Orton, Z.N. Brooke eds. 1932).
" The Great Reform Act of 1832 extended enfranchisement and redistributed seats in the
House of Commons. See 10 THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 600-19 (A.W. Ward, G.W.
Prothero, S. Leathes eds. 1907). Measures to lessen institutionalized discrimination against
Catholics had been adopted earlier in the Catholic Relief Act of 1829. Id. at 620-54. The
Reform Act of 1867, the Franchise Act of 1884, and the Redistribution Act of 1885 extended
and consolidated earlier reforms. 11 id. 338-46 (1909); 12 id. 41-42 (1910). See generally SIR
LLEWELLYN WOODWARD, THE AGE OF REFORM, 1815-1870 (2d ed. 1962); and D. BEALES, FROM
CASTLEREAGH TO GLADSTONE, 1815-1885 (1969).
" In addition to the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, various post-
Civil War legislative acts articulated the concept of equal rights under the law, guaranteed
property rights, and provided civil and criminal liability for the deprivation of civil rights.
18 U.S .C. §§ 241, 242; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985. The Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960,
1964, and 1968, and the Voting Rights Acts of 1965 and 1970 guaranteed, among others, the
right to vote and prohibited indirect means of denying the vote-means such as literacy tests
and registration technicalities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1975e, 2000a to 2000h-6, 3601 to
3619, 3631. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Supreme Court
abolished poll taxes. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and following cases the Court laid
the basis for legislative reapportionment which would guarantee that each citizen's vote
would have equal weight. See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
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law. The first discovery one makes is that there is no international
legislature, though there are some quasi-legislative processes. The
situation is not very different from the old common law period,
when the Parliament was more concerned with taxes and the privi-
leges of the nobility and clergy than with legislating. 6 The interna-
tional system still depends primarily on sources of customary law,
the interplay between the practice of States and the contributions
of courts and jurists. While the rules of international law can be
traced to ancient China, India, Middle East, and Greece, 7 and
many rules were developed by the practice of the multitudinous
medieval countries, especially the Italian city-states, 8 these rules
were first systematized in the 17th and 18th centuries by several
ingenious jurists, who wove together the practice of ancient and
modern States as described in the Bible, classical histories, and
medieval and early modem chronicles." Other jurists started col-
lecting international treaties"' and diplomatic correspondence;2 ' and
at the beginning of the 19th century such eminent jurists as Chief
Justice John Marshall, Justice Joseph Story, and Sir William Scott
(later Lord Stowell) started enunciating principles of international
law, mostly taking for granted the rules concocted by the writers of
the preceding period, from Grotius to Vattel.22 That century saw
1, See 7 THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY, supra note 13, at 704-15; 10 THE CAMBRIDGE
MODERN HISTORY, supra note 14, at 594-98; R. LOCKYER, HABSBURG AND BOURBON EUROPE 185-
92 (1974).
'7 See, e.g., Hsu CH'UAN-PAO, LE DRorr DES GENS ET LA CHINE ANTIQUE (1926); W. MARTIN,
TRACES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANCIENT CHINA (Bound reprint, source unidentified, 1881);
P. BANDYOPADHYAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM IN ANCIENT INDIA (1920); S.V. VISWANA-
THA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANCIENT INDIA (1925); G. KESTEMONT, DIPLOMATIQUE ET Dsorr
INTERNATIONAL EN AsIE OCCIDENTALE, 1600-1200 av. J.C. (1974); W. Huss, UNTERSUCHUNGEN
zuR AUSSENPOLITIK PToLEMAIOS' IV (1976); C. PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM
OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME (1911); V. MARTIN, LA VIE INTERNATIONALE DANS LA GRACE DES
CrrES (1940).
* See A.P. SERENI, THE ITALIAN CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-124 (1943).
" See, e.g., H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, lib. II, cap. XXI, § V. In a 3-page
discussion of one aspect of the rights of suppliants, he cites the books of Deuteronomy,
Exodus, and Kings; Cicero, Antiphon, Marcus Aurelius, Tacitus, Philo, and Plutarch; Frede-
garius' Chronicle of King Pepin, Concilia Galliae, Aimoin, Leunclavius' Turkish History, and
Procopius' Gothic War; and Mariana, Simler, and Camden-among others.
" See, e.g., J. DUMONT, CORPS UNIVERSEL DIPLOMATIQUE DU Dsorr DES GENS (Amsterdam
and The Hague 1726-1731); G.F. VON MARTENS, RECUEIL DES PRINCIPAUX TRArrIs D'ALLIANCE,
DE PAIX, DE TROVE, DE NEUTRALrrg, DE COMMERCE, DE LIMITES, D'ECHANGE, ETC., CONCLUS PAR
LES PUISSANCES DE L'EUROPE TANT ENTRE ELLS QU'AVEC LES PUISSANCES ET ETATS DANS D'AUTRES
PARTIES DU MONDE DEPUIS 1761 JUSQU'A PRIsENT, 1st series (Gottingue 1791-1801); J.L.
GOTTFRIED, et al., THEATRUM EUROPAEUM (Frankfurt a.M. 1635-1738); C. PELLER, THEATRUM
PACIS (Nuremberg 1663-1685).
21 See, e.g., K. VON MARTENS, CAUSES CikLIkBRES DU DROIT DES GENS (Leipzig and Paris 1827).
n While Chief Justice Marshall tended more toward the statement of general principles,
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also a proliferation of international arbitral tribunals which also
relied mostly on the law as transmitted to them by the various
authors.2 3 New writers added national and international decisions to
the sources of international law from which they derived the princi-
ples of international law; and slowly a new hierarchy of these
sources developed, giving higher status to decisions of international
and domestic tribunals and slowly diminishing the importance of
the writings of eminent jurists." The second half of the 19th century
without citation of specific authority for each-as does the International Court of Jus-
tice-the arguments of the counsel in the reports of cases before him are full of references to
Vattel and other eminent authors. See B. ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL
15-23 (1939). Among Chief Justice Marshall's opinions dealing with questions of international
law are those in the following cases: Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804); Rose
v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812); United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818); and The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). In the latter, Marshall found that the slave trade
was not criminal according to the law of nations, even though most nations prohibited it. Cf.
Justice Story's opinion in United States v. The Schooner La Jeune Eugknie, 26 F. Cas. 832
(1st Cir. 1822) (No. 15, 551), in which he comes to the opposite conclusion. Other cases involv-
ing international law decided by Justice Story include: The Ann, 1 F. Cas. 926 (1st Cir. 1812)
(No. 397); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); and The Apollon, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 362 (1824). Among Sir William Scott's opinions of note on international law are:
The Young Jacob and Johanna, 1 C. Rob 20 (Adm. 1798); the two cases of The Twee
Gebroeders, 165 Eng. Rep. 422 and 485, (Adm. 1800 and 1801); The Anna, 165 Eng. Rep. 809,
(Adm. 1805); and Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (Adm. 1817). For further analysis of the
opinions of Justice Story and Sir William Scott, see respectively, Dunne, Joseph Story, 77
HARV. L. REv. 240 (1964), and E.S. ROSCOE, LORD STOWELL, His LIFE AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ENGLISH PRIZE LAW (1916).
" See, e.g., (1) Iroquois River Boundary (Great Britain-United States), Arbitration under
the Treaty of Ghent of 1814 (1822); 1 J.B. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 166 (1898) [hereinafter cited
as MOORE]; H. LA FONTAINE, PASICRISIE INTERNATIONALE 16 (1902) [hereinafter cited as LA
FONTAINE]; 1 A. DE LAPRADELLE & N. PoLmrIs, RECUEIL DES ARBIrRAGES INTERNATIONAUX 314
(1905) [hereinafter cited as LAPRADELLE]; (2) The John S. Bryan (Brazil-United States),
Commission under the Agreement of 1842 (1843), 5 MOORE 4613; (3) Portendick Blockade
(France-Great Britain), Arbitration under Declaration of 1842 (1843), LA FONTAINE 25, 1
LAPRADELLE 525, 5 MOORE 4936, 42 BRIT. FOR. ST. PAPERS 1377 (1864); (4) The Enterprise, the
Hermosa, and the Creole (Great Britain-United States), Arbitrations under the Convention
of 1853 (1855), N.G. UPHAM, REPORT OF DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION OF CLAIMS . . . BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 187, 238, 241 (1856); (5) The Faber Case (Germany-
Venezuela), Commission under the 1903 Agreement (1903), J.H. RALSTON AND W.T.S. DOYLE,
VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903, at 600 (1904); 10 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 438.
2 Concerning the role of international decisions as a source or evidence of international law,
see 1 J.B. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS: ANCIENT AND MODERN: MODERN SERIES
lxxviii-lxxxiii (1929). The following list of sources of international law appears in H. WHEA-
TON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-27 (8th ed. R. Dana ed. 1866): text writers, transla-
tors, ordinances and prize tribunals of particular States, adjudications of international tri-
bunals, written opinions of jurisconsults to their own governments. Compare this list with
the analysis in Pollock, The Sources of International Law, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 511-24 (1902).
Pollock gives a featured place to custom, multilateral agreements, and decisions of interna-
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saw a new phenomenon, the development of international rules by
international conferences which adopted multilateral treaties codi-
fying certain areas of the law and sometimes establishing interna-
tional institutions to assist in their implementation."5 This process
culminated in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 which codi-
fied both the rules of war and the procedures for the peaceful settle-
ment of international disputes. 6 The process of codification of inter-
national law was continued by the League of Nations, which ar-
ranged for the preparation of many important international conven-
tions." But its largest effort, the Hague Conference of 1930, was only
a partial success, codifying the rules of international law relating to
nationality, but failing to reach agreement on rules concerning the
responsibility of States for injuries to aliens and on the regime of the
territorial sea. 28 The United Nations institutionalized the process of
codification; the General Assembly established a permanent Inter-
tional tribunals; he regards text-writers only as sources of evidence of State practice. In an
1899 case, Justice Gray said that to determine international law "where there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, to the works of jurists
and commentators." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899) (emphasis added).
Cockburn, C.J., in the 1905 case of the Queen v. Keyn, stated that "writers on international
law, however valuable their labours may be in elucidating and ascertaining the principles and
rules of law, cannot make the law." [1876-1877] 2 Ex. D. 63, 202 (1876). Accord, West Rand
Central Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391, 401-08 (1905).
2 See 1 M.O. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION xviii-xxxvi (1931); and see generally
R.L. BRIDGMAN, THE FIRST BOOK OF WORLD LAW (1911).
21 For an analysis of the work of the Conferences, together with texts of the conventions
agreed and other documents, see J.B. SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACz CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907
(1909).
21 Work of the League of Nations in the Matter of International Conventions: Signatures,
Ratifications and Accessions in Respect of Agreements and Conventions Concluded under the
Auspices of the League of Nations, (League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supps. 193 and 195 (1944)).
The United Nations Secretariat's most recent compilation of Multilateral Treaties in respect
of which the Secretary General performs Depositary Functions lists 30 League of Nations
Treaties falling into that category which were still in force as of December 31, 1976. U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.D/10 at 543-99; U.N. Pub. E. 77. V.7 (1977).
21 Final Act of the Conference for the Codification of International Law held at The Hague
in March-April 1930, April 12, 1930, 1 Acts of the Conference for the Codification of Interna-
tional Law 139-78, L.N. Doc. C.351.M.145.1930.V, L.N. Pub. 1930.V.14 (1930); also reprinted
in 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 841-80 (S.
Rosenne ed. 1975). For commentary on the work of the Conference see Hudson, First Confer-
ence for the Codification of International Law, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 447-66 (1930); Flournoy,
Nationality Convention, Protocols and Recommendations Adopted by the First Conference
on the Codification of International Law, id. 467-85; Reeves, Codification of the Law of
Territorial Waters, id. 486-99; Hackworth, Responsibility of States for Damages Caused in
Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, id. 500-16; Borchard, "Responsibility
of States, "at The Hague Codification Conference, id. 517-40; Scott, Nationality, id. 556-61;
Miller, The Hague Codification Conference, id. 674-93.
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national Law Commission for the codification and progressive de-
velopment of international law; and the Commission after a careful
survey of the whole field of international law, prepared a priority
list, and started preparing comprehensive conventions covering one
area after another.21 Among the most successful accomplishments
were the conventions on diplomatic relations, consular relations,
and the law of treaties. 0 The Commission's preparatory work on the
law of the sea led to the adoption of four conventions by the First
Law of the Sea Conference in 1958,' but the Second Conference on
that subject in 1960 could not agree on the limits of the territorial
sea and of fishing jurisdiction. 32 An imaginative 1967 initiative by
Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta31 led to the establishment of a
special committee for the preparation of rules which could govern
the exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed and ocean floor
(the so-called "manganese nodules"), which were considered as a
" Article 18 of the Statute of the International Law Commission provides that "the Com-
mission shall survey the whole field of international law with a view to selecting topics for
codification, having in mind existing drafts, whether governmental or not." The United
Nations Secretariat prepared a preliminary summary of possible topics in 1948. United Na-
tions, International Law Commission, Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work
of Codification of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/1; U.N. Pub. 1948.
V.1. At its first session in 1949 the International Law Commission decided on three topics
for priority treatment: regime of the high seas, the law of treaties, and arbitral procedure.
[19491 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 281. In a 1970 survey of its future work, the International Law
Commission listed 15 subjects on which it had submitted final drafts, and 10 topics on its
program for the future. Another 17 were listed as having been suggested but not yet adopted
for study. [1970] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 247-69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add. 1.
Concerning the work of the Commission generally, see UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (1972); and H. BIGGs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
(1965).
11 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No.
7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (as of January 1, 1977, 120 States were parties). Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (as
of January 1, 1977, 79 States were parties). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (not yet in force).
11 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, April 29,
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention on Fishing and Conser-
vation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No.
5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
32 Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, U.N. Docs.
A/CONF.19/8 and 9; U.N. Pubs. 60.V.6 and 62.V.3.
11 Note Verbale of August 17, 1967, from the Permanent Mission of Malta to the United
Nations, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, U.N.Doc. A/6695 (1967); Speech
by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta to the First Committee of the General Assembly (Nov.
1, 1967), 22 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1515th and 1516th mtgs.), U.N. Docs. A/C.1/PV 1515 and 1516
(1974).
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"common heritage of mankind." 4 To that task was soon added the
job of preparing a code on the law of the sea, revising drastically
some of the rules codified only a few years before (in 1958).35 The
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea started meeting in 1973,
and in 1977, after six sessions, reached a large measure of agreement
on most law of the sea subjects and on a complex system for settling
international disputes which may arise with respect to the interpre-
tation and application of this codification. 6 But big disputes still
persist with respect to the problem which led to this new codifica-
tion effort, that is, the deep seabed mining. In this area, there is a
confrontation between the industrial countries which wish to obtain
almost automatic access to the minerals of the seabed, and the
developing countries which are primarily interested in ensuring that
an international "Enterprise" will exploit these resources for the
benefit of the developing countries and that the mining enterprises
of the developed countries will be somehow subordinated to an in-
ternational Authority dominated by the developing countries. 7
Thus, this codifying venture may still founder on this undersea rock,
but one should not neglect the fact that through an elaborate negoti-
ating process, experimenting with the new methods for preparing
international codificatory instruments, an international assembly of
some 150 States has practically reached a consensus on more than
300 articles affecting many vital interests-maritime commerce,
national and international security, fishing, protection of the envi-
ronment, scientific research, and the settlement of international
disputes. While an important part of the glass is empty, the glass
31 On December 18, 1967, the General Assembly ordered the establishment of the Ad Hoc
Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits
of National Jurisdiction. G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 14, U.N. Doc. A/6716
(1968). Following the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee (U.N. Doc. A/7230, 1968), the General
Assembly, on December 21, 1968, established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-
Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. G.A. Res. 2467-A, 23
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 15, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969). The committee, commonly called
the Sea-Bed Committee, continued work until 1973.
" The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was called for by a resolu-
tion of the General Assembly of December 17, 1970. G.A. Res. 2750-C, U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 28) 26, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). This resolution expanded the Sea-Bed Committee, and
expressly instructed it to take responsibility for the preparation of draft articles for the
Conference.
3 A draft, called the Informal Composite Negotiating Text [hereinafter cited as ICNT],
was prepared at the end of the sixth session of the Conference in July of 1977. U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/WP.10 (1977). It consists of 303 articles and seven annexes.
17 ICNT, supra note 36, Part XI and Annexes II and III. See also Statement by Ambassador




is three-quarters full, and the interests protected by the agreed arti-
cles are of crucial importance to both the United States and many
other States.
Apart from this sophisticated and complex process of codifica-
tion, the old methods of shaping international law still persist. The
number of bipartite and multipartite treaties concluded since 1945
probably exceeds the number of treaties concluded in the previous
3000 years." Many new fields are thus covered by a network of
international agreements, and several hundreds of international
organizations watch over the execution of many of them. 39 The ear-
lier diplomatic practice of States has become more accessible with
the publication of various digests;40 but with the advent of a
hundred new States, the pace of international negotiations has
grown beyond the capacity of many foreign offices to handle them,
much less to document them properly. The task of lawyers trying
to keep abreast of current practice of States has become extremely
difficult, and each year the situation is growing worse. At the same
time, the number of books and articles on international law has
greatly multiplied, without shedding, however, enough light on the
new principles which seem to be developing.
Similarly, the increasing interdependence of nations, the greater
mobility of the world's population, and the growth in transnational
corporations and transactions, have brought more international
problems to national courts, which have found it rather difficult to
deal with many complex international issues, having to rely quite
often on not completely unbiased advice of the executive branches
of national governments." On the other hand, there has been a
"I By October 1973, 13,477 treaties had been registered or filed and recorded with the
United Nations. There are perhaps as many treaties which have not been registered or filed.
The League of Nations registered only 4,834 treaties. By the time it is complete, the CON-
SOUDATED TREATY SERIES, being compiled by Professor Clive Parry, will probably contain
between 15,000 and 17,000 instruments. That series will cover the period 1648 to 1920.
Dean Rusk noted that in 1965 the United States was a party to 4,300 treaties and interna-
tional agreements, of which "three-fourths ... were signed in the last 25 years." Rusk, The
Unseen Search for Peace, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 690, 693 (1965).
11 A.J. PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
(2d ed. 1961); [1972-731 Y.B. INT'L ORG. 714-15. The former lists 138 international organiza-
tions, and the latter 257, exclusive of the United Nations family.
0 See, e.g., J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906); G.H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1940-1944); M.M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963-
1973); C. PARRY, A BRITISH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965-1967); A.C. Kiss, RAPERTOIRE
DE LA PRATIQUE FRANqAISE EN MATItRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1962-72).
" See Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of its Functions? 40 AM. J. INT'L L.
168-72 (1946).
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decrease in the number of cases submitted to international courts
and tribunals, except in Europe where specialized courts have coped
quite effectively with such difficult issues as European economic
integration and human rights. 2 In the last decade, the International
Court of Justice has had only a few cases, and there have been but
few international arbitrations.43
Nevertheless the contribution of the Court to the shaping of inter-
national law is an important one. In several recent cases it has
emphasized the application of equitable legal principles,4 and to
the dismay of some dissenting judges it has arrogated to itself "a
creative power," becoming a "begetter" of new ideas and pointing
the way in which the law should be developed. 5 Similarly, some
recent arbitrations have helped to clarify, or develop, important
rules of international law."
11 Official reports of the Court of Justice of the European Communities are contained in
REPORTS OF CASES BEFORE THE COURT (Luxembourg, English ed. since 1962). COMMON MARKET
LAW REPORTS (Benenson, Blom-Cooper, and Valentine ed. since 1963) also contain these
cases, as well as selected cases from municipal courts. See also D.VALENTINE, THE COURT OF
JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1965); E. WALL, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES (1966); VIE CONGRtS INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT EUROPOEN, LA JURISPRUDENCE
EUROPPENNE APRtS VINGT ANS D'ExPIRIENCE COMMUNAUTAIRE (1976). Official reports of the
European Court of Human Rights are contained in PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (Series A, Judgments and Decisions; Series B, Pleadings, Oral Arguments and
Documents) (Strasbourg). A separate volume is put out for each case. See also A.H. ROBERT-
SON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (1963); K. VASAK, LA CONVENTION EUROPPENNE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME (1964); DIGEST OF CASE-LAw RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, 1955-1967 (1970).
,a Since 1922 the International Court of Justice (and its predecessor the Permanent Court
of International Justice) have rendered the following numbers of final judgments and advisory
opinions in each decade: 1922-30, thirty-six; 1931-40, thirty-two; 1941-50, seven (all between
1948 and 1950); 1951-60, twenty; 1961-70, five; 1971-77, six. As to the number of recent
arbitrations see Sohn, Report on International Arbitration, [1966] INT'L L. ASS'N, REP. OF
THE 52D CONF. 323, 330-33 (1967).
" E.g., "[lilt is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice,
but of applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles."
North Sea Continental Shelf, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 47. See also Fisheries Jurisdiction (United
Kingdom v. Iceland), [19741 I.C.J. 3, 30.
1S Judge Ignacio-Pinto, [19741 I.C.J. 35, 37-38. He also made the following statement in
his dissenting opinion in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case: "Furthermore, it causes me some
concern also that the majority of the Court seems to have adopted the position . . . in the
present Judgment with the intention of pointing the way for the participants in the Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea . . . . The Court here gives the impression of being anxious to
indicate the principles on the basis of which it would be desirable that a general international
regulation of rights . . . should be adopted." Id. at 37.
11 E.g., Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (France v. United Kingdom), mimeographed
decision (1977) (to be published in AM. J. INT'L L.). The Court here found that the so-called
"natural prolongation" rule enunciated in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, supra note
44, was limited to cases where it produced an equitable delimitation. Decision, paras. 192-
95.
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Most new countries prefer to deal with their disputes through
regional and United Nations channels. When one of them has a
dispute with a major power, it prefers to bring it before the United
Nations, where it can more easily obtain support from other coun-
tries in its region or even from the whole group of developing coun-
tries. While in the past it was in the interest of smaller States to
channel their disputes to international tribunals and have them
decided on the basis of law, today the major powers may find it safer
to go to a court rather-than a political body dominated by an un-
friendly majority. At the same time, the new States are reluctant
to go to the International Court of Justice because they fear, not
completely unjustifiedly, that the Court is too conservative and does
not understand the "new" international law which is being rapidly
developed by new methods more attuned to the rapidly changing
requirements of the modern age.47
What are these new means? It is generally accepted that the
Charter of the United Nations is in fact the constitution of the
international community and as such prevails over other interna-
tional agreements or domestic laws.4" The application of such a
principle in the United States would require giving the Charter
primacy even over later federal legislation, and for the moment no
direct confrontation has arisen. Issues have been raised, however,
over some decisions of United Nations bodies, e.g., in the Rhodesian
chrome case,49 and in several instances over the self-executing char-
"7 These States were particularly dissatisfied with the judgment or opinion in the following
International Court of Justice cases: South West Africa, Second Phase, [19661 I.C.J. 3;
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),
[1974] I.C.J. 3, 174; Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12.
1" The Charter is thus the cornerstone of international jus cogens, which was defined by
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 as a peremptory norm of
international law "from which no derogation is permitted." U.N. Conference on the Law of
Treaties, Official Records, Documents of the Conference 296, U.N. Pub. E.70.V.5. The
Charter itself provides that the obligations under it prevail over "obligations under any other
international agreement." U.N. CHARTER art. 103. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties confirms the principle recognized by several international tribunals that a
"party may not invoke the provisions of internal law as justification for its failure to perform
a treaty." On the need to reconsider the United States rule that a later law prevails over an
earlier treaty, see W. MCCLURE, WORLD LEGAL ORDER: POSSIBLE CONTRIBUT IONS BY THE PEOPLES
OF THE UNITED STATES (1969).
11 On December 16, 1966 the Security Council adopted a resolution which, inter alia,
directed member States to cease all importation of certain commodities, including chrome,
from Southern Rhodesia. S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions, at 7, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1966). The United States voted in favor of the resolution. 21 U.N. SCOR
(1340th mtg.) 25, U.N. Doc. SIPV 1340 (1966). In 1968 the President of the United States
issued Executive Orders specifying criminal penalties for violation of this embargo. Exec.
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acter of United Nations instruments.50
The Charter of the United Nations, like the Constitution of the
United States, is written in broad and general language requiring
constant interpretation. We have seen that, depending on current
trends and the mood of the Supreme Court, such interpretation can
either broaden or narrow the scope of the original instrument. Simi-
larly, the organs of the United Nations can by their interpretation
of the Charter broaden the scope of the United Nations, especially
when there is unanimous agreement on the subject, or at least no
open disagreement. A Committee at the 1945 San Francisco Confer-
ence pointed out that "if an interpretation made by any organ of the
Organization or by a committee of jurists is not generally acceptable
it will be without binding force."'" The United Nations has been
willing to proceed on the basis of the corollary principle that an
interpretation which is generally acceptable (i.e., was adopted
unanimously, or without any negative vote, or without a vote, by
consensus) is binding on all the Members. The records of the United
Nations show that many resolutions have been adopted in such a
manner and thus constitute binding interpretations of the Charter.
While most of these resolutions were ephemeral or dealt with sub-
jects of only limited relevance to Charter interpretation, some of
them constitute important extensions of the Charter.
Orders Nos. 11322 and 11419, 3 C.F.R. § 606 and § 737 (1968), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 287c.
However, in 1971 Congress passed the so-called "Byrd Amendment" to the Strategic Materi-
als Stock Piling Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h. The Byrd Amendment had the effect of removing
the prohibition on the importation of Rhodesian chrome. On February 28, 1972, the Security
Council passed another resolution, reaffirming its earlier action on the subject, and stating
that any legislation by any State which permitted the importation of certain Southern Rhode-
sian commodities "including chrome ore, would undermine sanctions and would be contrary
to the obligations of States." S.C. Res. 314, 28 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions, at 7, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/28 (1973). A group of persons brought an action against the Secretary of the Treasury
to enjoin such importation and require seizure of any contraband. The action was dismissed
by the United States District Court. On appeal, the court (after an initial finding that
appellants had standing) found that "Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so,
and there is nothing the other branches of government can do about it. We [the court]
consider that this is precisely what Congress has done in [the Byrd Amendment]." Diggs v.
Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, at 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
In Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), the court found that, although
the Charter was a treaty and thus the law of the land, it was not self-executing. For discussion
of this and similar cases, some of which took a different point of view, see L. SOHN & T.
BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 944-47 (1973). Concerning the so-
called "Bricker Amendment" to the Constitution, which would have limited the domestic
effect of international agreements, see id. 948-71.
1 Report of Committee IV/2 of the United Nations Conference on International Organiza-
tion, San Francisco, June 12, 1945. Doc. 933, IV/2/42(2), 13 United Nations Conference on
International Organization Documents 703, 709-10 (1945).
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Thus after eight years of in-depth discussions in the General As-
sembly and its special committee on the subject, the General As-
sembly adopted unanimously in 1970 a "Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations," which contained a far-reaching interpretation of
the fundamental principles embodied in Article 2 of the Charter.12
For instance, the additional principles relating to the prohibition of
the use of force make it clear that states have the duty to refrain
from using force not only across existing international boundaries,
but also across international lines of demarcation; that acts of re-
prisal involving the use of force are included in the prohibition and
that
[elvery State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its terri-
tory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts
referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of
force.5 3
Similarly, a new dimension was added to the principle of nonin-
tervention, by the inclusion in the Declaration of such principles as
the following:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and
all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the
personality of the State or against its political, economic and cul-
tural elements, are in violation of international law.
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to
obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State
shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive,
terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow
of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another
State.5"
s2 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121-24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
I ld. at 122-23.
Id. at 123. An almost identical text was previously included in the Declaration on Inad-
missibility of Intervention, approved by Resolution 2131 of the 20th General Assembly, De-
cember 21, 1965, which was also adopted without a negative vote, but with several important
abstentions in the First Committee vote. 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 11-12, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1966). See also id., 3 Annexes (Agenda Item 107), at 9.
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From the point of view of the new Members from Africa and Asia
the value of the Declaration was enhanced by embodying in it var-
ious principles relating to self-determination. Among others, the
Declaration includes the following principles on that subject:
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action
which deprives peoples. . . of their right to self-determination and
freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance
to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to
self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive
support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter. 51
It is noteworthy that the General Assembly declared further that the
"principles of the Charter which are embodied in this Declaration
constitute basic principles of international law;" and appealed to all
States, including, thus, non-members, "to be guided by these prin-
ciples in their international conduct and to develop their mutual
relations on the basis of the strict observance of these principles. '56
This is but one important example of the legislative activity of the
General Assembly, leading to the creation of new international law
applicable to all States. Similar action, through unanimously ap-
proved declarations, was taken by the General Assembly in such
important areas as outer space57 and the seabed.5" One could include
in this category also the resolution approving a detailed definition
of aggression, a result of some fifty years of codificatory efforts.59
All these declarations are not ordinary international treaties or
conventions and were not subject to ratification. Nevertheless, there
is a wide consensus that these declarations actually established new
rules of international law binding upon all States. This is not treaty-
making but a new method of creating customary international law.
As was noted before, historically, customary international law was
to a large extent created by eminent international jurists who, in
general or special treatises, collected laboriously many diplomatic
5 G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 52, at 124.
"' Id.
.1 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, approved by G.A. Res. 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 15) 15-16, U.N.
Doc. A/5515 (1964).
" Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, approved by G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24-25, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
11 G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142-44, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975). For
a comprehensive history of the preparation of this document and its many predecessors, see
B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION (1975).
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notes, national and international judicial documents, and the opin-
ions of other scholars, with respect to particular rules of interna-
tional law. If there was a wide measure of agreement, or at least no
important disagreements, a national or international decision-
maker usually concluded that a new rule had been established and
by his own decision added further evidence that the rule existed.
The process usually took a long time, because similar cases do not
often arise in international affairs, and the access to official docu-
ments is usually delayed for many years. It often required some
important international litigation for both the Foreign Offices con-
cerned and outside scholars to get interested in a particular rule to
the extent necessary to collect from various archives the relevant
practice.
In the United Nations this process has been expedited. By ad-
dressing notes to its Member Governments, the United Nations can
obtain relevant information from their files and their opinions about
the need for and the content of the new rules to be adopted. If
additional views of Governments need to be obtained, modern com-
munication techniques allow rapid transmission of such views or of
new negotiation instructions. The existence in New York of perma-
nent missions of almost all States of the world permits a constant
exchange of views and speeds up the negotiation process. A draft
thus agreed upon can be transmitted quickly to the Foreign Minis-
tries, and their final approval can be obtained before final action.
In the case of each United Nations declaration it took several years
of preliminary discussions, both in the Assembly itself and in a
special committee, as well as a few months of hard, last-minute
negotiations to remove the remaining obstacles, with repeated calls
to Foreign Ministries for changes in instructions. Once, however, the
text of a declaration was agreed upon, all the countries concerned
were willing to adopt the new principles embodied therein without
further formalities. Thus the United Nations has made possible the
creation of "instant international law."6 Many traditional interna-
tional lawyers have not reconciled themselves yet to this new ap-
proach and some legal advisers of Foreign Offices still like to raise
doubts about the true nature and effect of such declarations. But
it is quite obvious that most States have found this new procedure
quite useful and are willing to apply it whenever they are confronted
with important issues of interpreting the basic rules of the Charter
" Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Cus-
tomary Law? 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23-48 (1965).
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of the United Nations or of developing new law for new areas made
accessible by modern science and technology. In a rapidly changing
world the United Nations has found a method, albeit restricted by
the rule of unanimity or quasi-unanimity, to adapt the principles
of its Charter and the rules of customary international law to the
changing times with an efficiency which even its most optimistic
founders did not anticipate.
A special problem has arisen in the field of human rights. The
Charter of the United Nations contains a variety of provisions on
that subject. In particular, in accordance with Article 55 of the
Charter, the United Nations has the duty to promote "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or reli-
gion." In addition, Article 56 contains a "pledge" by all Members
of the United Nations "to take joint and separate action in coopera-
tion with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55. '"f While these provisions are general, neverthe-
less they have the force of positive international law and create basic
duties which all Members must fulfill in good faith. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice has declared that "to establish . . . and to
enforce distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations based
on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which
constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant viola-
tion of the purposes and principles of the Charter."6
The generality of the provisions of the Charter led, however, to
contentions that it could not be applied to concrete situations until
the human rights and fundamental freedoms specified in the
Charter had been more specifically defined in an International Bill
of Rights. 3 Consequently, one of the first tasks undertaken by the
United Nations was the preparation of that instrument, as one of
the first tasks of the newly born Congress of the United States was
to approve the first ten amendments to the Constitution containing
a comprehensive bill of rights. The start was made in 1948, with the
adoption by the General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which provided a comprehensive list of basic rights
and freedoms. 4 At the beginning there was some doubt whether the
" Other provisions on human rights are contained in the preamble to the Charter, and in
its Articles 1, 13, 62(2), 68, 73, 76.
" Advisory Opinion relating to thelegal consequences for States of the continued presence
of South Africa in Namibia, June 21, 1971, [19711 I.C.J. 16, 57.
, E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 31-32 (1964).
G.A. Res. 217-A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948).
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Declaration could be considered as binding. While some delegates
claimed that the Declaration merely set up a common standard
which the peoples of the world should strive to achieve, others ex-
pressed the view that the Declaration stated explicitly what human
rights Member States already pledged themselves in the Charter to
observe, and that any violation of the Declaration was a violation
of the principles of the Charter. As the Declaration was adopted
unanimously (with eight abstentions), it constituted an authorita-
tive interpretation of the Charter; and various organs of the United
Nations did not hesitate to contend that by failing to observe a
provision of the Declaration a Member had violated Articles 55 and
56 of the Charter. The Declaration deprived any Member accused
of a violation of a human right specified in the Declaration of the
defense plea that it did not know that this particular right was
embraced by the Charter obligation to observe human rights.
The practice of the United Nations confirms this conclusion.6
Even States which originally expressed doubts about the legal force
of the Declaration have not hesitated to invoke it and to accuse
other States of having violated their obligations under the Declara-
tion. The United States, for instance, invoked the Declaration in the
so-called Russian Wives Case even before the ink on the Declaration
was dry. The General Assembly adopted a resolution on the sub-
ject, in which it declared that the Soviet measures preventing Rus-
sian wives from leaving the Soviet Union with their foreign hus-
bands were "not in conformity with the Charter;" it cited Articles
13 and 16 of the Declaration in support of this conclusion.68
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has voted for most of the
resolutions relating to southern Africa in which the Declaration was
invoked by the General Assembly. To this group belong several
resolutions relating to the treatment of people of Indian and Paki-
stani origin in South Africa,6" the administration of South West
S3(1) U.N. GAOR, C.3 (89th, 91st-93d and 108th mtgs.) 32, 35, 51, 61, 64, 199-200; id.,
(180th-183d plen. mtgs.) 860, 862, 866, 880, 887, 910, 923-29, 933-34. See Sohn, A Short
History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGAN-
IZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 59-72 (1968).
"6 See generally, UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9-19, U.N. Doc.
ST/HR/2, U.N. Pub. E.74.XIV.2 (1974); van Asbeck, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and Its Implementation in International Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN SEARCH
OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 554-75 (van Panhuys and van Leeuwen Boomkamp eds.
1976).
.7 3(1) U.N. GAOR, C.6 (137th mtg.) 735-39 (1948).
" G.A. Res. 285, U.N. Doc. A/900, at 34-35 (1949).
" See, e.g., G.A. Res. 395, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 24, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
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Africa,70 and the policies of apartheid in South Africa." The Secu-
rity Council requested South Africa "to cease forthwith its contin-
ued imposition of discriminatory and repressive measures which are
contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter and which are
in violation of its obligations as a Member of the United Nations
and of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.''72
The duty of all Members, and indeed of all States, whether Mem-
bers or not, to comply with the Universal Declaration was confirmed
by two later Declarations which were also adopted unanimously (the
first one -with nine abstentions, the second one with one Member not
participating in the vote). Thus the 1960 Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples proclaimed
that all States "shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and the new Declaration.73 Similarly, the 1963 Dec-
laration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
contained a provision that every State "shall fully and faithfully
observe . . . the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and the
two other Declarations.74
Taking these developments into account, the unofficial Assembly
for Human Rights, which met in Montreal in March 1968, stated
that the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order, and
has over the years become a part of customary international law."75
In the Declaration of Teheran, the official International Conference
on Human Rights, which met at Teheran in April-May 1968,
reached a similar conclusion and proclaimed that the "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states a common understanding of the
peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights
of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation
for the members of the international community."78 The General
7U See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1142-B, 12 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 25. U.N. Doc. A/3805 (1957).
7' See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1598, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16A) 5, U.N. Doc. AJ4684/Add.1
(1961).
72 S.C. Res. 182 of Dec. 4, 1963, 18 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions, at 8-10, U.N. Doc.
S/INF./18/Rev. 1 (1966).
11 G.A. Res. 1514, para. 7, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
7, Article II of the Declaration, approved by General Assembly Resolution 1904 of Novem-
ber 20, 1963; 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.15) 35-37, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1964).
71 Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights, New York, 1968, at 2; reprinted
in 9 J. OF THE INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, No. 1, at 94, 95 (June 1968).
, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41,
U.N. Pub. E. 68. XIV.2, at 3, 4 para. 2.
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Assembly of the United Nations in December 1968 endorsed the
Proclamation of Teheran "as an important and timely reaffirmation
of the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights." "
As one of the chief framers of the Declaration, Charles Malik
(Lebanon), pointed out on its twenty-fifth anniversary, many
"United Nations resolutions-maybe hundreds of them-based
their arguments jointly on the Charter and the Declaration, and
mention the two in the same breath." He also noted that "when
people anywhere search for any authoritative listing of human rights
and fundamental freedoms that will serve as a 'standard of achieve-
ment' for themselves and their cultures, they can find nothing of the
depth, the authoritativeness and comprehensiveness of the Univer-
sal Declaration. ' 78
This excursion into the human rights field, which can be multi-
plied in other areas, is perhaps sufficient to show that modern inter-
national law can grow not only through ordinary practice of States
17 G.A. Res. 2442, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 49, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969). See also
the statement by the Secretary-General emphasizing the proclamation by the Teheran Con-
ference that the Universal Declaration constitutes "an obligation for the members of the
international community." Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on
the Work of the Organization, September 1968, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.lA) 13, U.N. Doc.
A/7201/Add.1 (1968).
11 Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Observance of the 25th Anniversary
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Report [of the] Human Rights Committee
10 (1973). When the Secretariat of the United Nations was requested by the Commission on
Human Rights in 1962 to give an opinion regarding the difference between a "declaration"
and a "recommendation" as far as the legal implications were concerned, it replied as follows
[E/CN.4/L.610; 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) 15, U.N. Doc. E/3616/Rev. 1 (1962)]:
In United Nations practice, a 'declaration' is a formal and solemn instrument,
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being
enunciated, such as the Declaration of Human Rights. A recommendation is less
formal.
Apart from the distinction just indicated, there is probably no difference between
a 'recommendation' and a 'declaration' in United Nations practice as far as strict
legal principle is concerned. A 'declaration' or a 'recommendation' is adopted by
resolution of a United Nations organ. As such it cannot be made binding upon
Member States, in the sense that a treaty or convention is binding upon the parties
to it, purely by the device of terming it a 'declaration' rather than a
,recommendation.' However, in view of the greater solemnity and significance of a
'declaration,' it may be considered to impart, on behalf of the organ adopting it, a
strong expectation that Members of the international community will abide by it.
Consequently, in so far as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice,
a 'declaration' may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding
upon States.
In conclusion, it may be said that in United Nations practice, a 'declaration' is
a solemn instrument resorted to only in very rare cases relating to matters of major
and lasting importance where maximum compliance is expected.
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but also by this extraordinary method of unanimous declarations
which either immediately, or in the course of time, become binding
international law, as soon as the international community has ac-
cepted them as such. Having thus become a part of customary inter-
national law they are even binding on non-Member States, as some
of these documents have expressly proclaimed.
One may perhaps dare to go even further. While there is an in-
creasing agreement on the binding force of instruments proclaiming
general principles implementing the Charter, can one consider deci-
sions of the Security Council and the General Assembly as binding
when they are rendered in quasi-judicial or executive capacity
rather than the quasi-legislative one discussed previously? Putting
it more precisely, as the Supreme Court by its decisions not only
interprets law but in fact often creates it or drastically modifies it,
can the Security Council or the General Assembly in some circum-
stances create law by establishing a line of precedents in a series of
concrete cases? There was never any doubt that certain resolutions
of these organs have a binding effect. This is particularly true with
respect to the decisions of the Security Council relating to enforce-
ment measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. In some cases
States have contested the binding character of other decisions of the
Security Council, especially those made under the provisions of
Chapter VI of the Charter relating to international disputes and
dangerous situations."9 The International Court of Justice laid these
doubts to rest in its 1971 Namibia opinion where it said:
It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only
to enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter. It is not possible to find in the Charter any support for
this view. Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to en-
forcement action but applies to "the decisions of the Security
Council" adopted in accordance with the Charter. Moreover, that
Article is placed, not in Chapter VII, but immediately after Article
24 in that part of the Charter which deals with the functions and
powers of the Security Council. If Article 25 had reference solely
to decisions of the Security Council concerning enforcement action
' For instance, see the discussion in the Greek Question in 1947. 2 U.N. SCOR (147th,
156th, 159th, 160th, 162d, 163d, 166th & 167th mtgs.) 1123-24, 1280-83, 1290-92, 1371-72,
1383, 1418-20, 1422-23, 1425-27, 1431-33, 1519-27, 1530-47 (1947). See also Kerley, The Powers
of Investigation of the United Nations Security Council, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 892-918 (1961).
The issue was raised also by the Secretary-General in the Congo Case. 15 U.N. SCOR, Supp.
(July-Sept. 1960) 45, at 48-49, U.N. Doc. S/4417; 15 U.N. SCOR (884th mtg.) 2-7, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.884 (1960); id. (920th mtg.) 18-22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.920 (1960).
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under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, that is to say, if it were
only such decisions which had binding effect, then Article 25 would
be superfluous, since this effect is secured by Articles 48 and 49 of
the Charter."
Similarly, it is quite clear that some decisions of the General
Assembly have "dispositive force and effect," as was noted by the
Court in its opinion in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations
Case."' In addition, one might consider that a decision of the Gen-
eral Assembly which applies a principle of the Charter to a particu-
lar case is binding because the Charter is binding and the General
Assembly "resolution merely gives effect to, and interprets, the
Charter in a specific case," thus creating "a legal obligation.""
Even if it is only, from the formal point of view, a recommendation,
it has behind it the force of the Charter.8 3
It has to be remembered also that recommendations of the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Security Council provide, on proper occa-
sions "a legal authorization for Members determined to act upon
them individually or collectively."" 4 Thus, if the General Assembly
or the Security Council should recommend that Members take cer-
tain actions to ensure the performance by a State of its Charter
obligations, that State cannot claim that these actions violate inter-
national law. There is a presumption that actions authorized by the
appropriate organs of the United Nations are legal, unless it can be
proven that the organ has acted ultra vires.
Even those recommendations of the General Assembly and the
Security Council which cannot be considered binding in any of the
senses discussed above, may nevertheless have certain important
effects. A Member of the United Nations would not be fulfilling in
good faith its obligations under the Charter, if it were simply to
ignore such recommendations without adducing any plausible rea-
sons for not giving effect to them. As Judge Lauterpacht has pointed
out, a resolution recommending "a specific course of action creates
some legal obligations" however "rudimentary, elastic and imper-
fect" it might be. The addressee State, "while not bound to accept
11 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of June 21, 1971; [19711 I.C.J. 16, 52-
53.
Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962; [19621 I.C.J. 151, 163-64.
' Statement by Mr. Belaunde (Peru) in the Hungarian Question, January 9, 1957. 11 U.N.
GAOR (634th plen. mtg.) 836-38.
1' Report of the Secretary-General in the Egyptian Question, February 11, 1957. 11 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 66), at 57-59 (1957).
1' Judge Lauterpacht in South West Africa-Voting Procedure Case, [19551 I.C.J. 67, 115.
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the recommendation, is bound to give it due consideration in good
faith." Should it decide to disregard it, "it is bound to explain the
reasons for its decision." A State
may not be acting illegally by declining to act upon a recommenda-
tion or series of recommendations on the same subject. But in
doing so it acts at its peril when a point is reached when the
cumulative effect of the persistent disregard of the articulate opin-
ion of the Organization is such as to foster the conviction that the
State in question has become guilty of disloyalty to the Principles
and Purposes of the Charter.
Consequently, a State which
consistently sets itself above the solemnly and repeatedly ex-
pressed judgment of the Organization, in particular in proportion
as that judgment approximates to unanimity, may find that it has
overstepped the imperceptible line between impropriety and ille-
gality, between discretion and arbitrariness, between the exercise
of the legal right to disregard the recommendation and the abuse
of that right, and that it has exposed itself to consequences legiti-
mately following as a legal sanction. 5
All these procedures depend for their binding effect on unanimity
or, in more recent practice, consensus. This is made possible by the
gradualness of the decision-making process. In a way consensus
creeps slowly upon the negotiating parties. The matter is discussed
in a variety of groups-subcommittees, working parties, contact
groups," "friends of the Chairman"" 7-and documents are sent back
and forth between the delegations and their home governments.
There is constant give-and-take, various compromises are tried, and
even those who are clearly in the minority get some of their formula-
tions accepted. The emerging result is a truly collective product,
and by the end it is difficult to identify who has contributed what
part of the final text. A skillful chairman or rapporteur is a master
at such blending of disparate views into a generally acceptable com-
promise. Consequently, it becomes difficult for any minority to
completely reject the final product of this prolonged negotiating
process. Consensus thus can be reached, at a moment carefully
chosen by a watchful chairman. Once the gavel is brought down,
' Id. at 118-20.
" This device is used, for instance, in the Trade Development Board; see J. OF THE U.N.
No. 77/167, at 2 (1977).
11 For the use of this device in various committees, see, e.g., J. OF THE U.N., No. 77/180, at
1, and No. 77/181, at 2 (1977).
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some delegations may record a few objections in the minutes, with-
out impairing the adoption of the generally agreed text.',
Some may claim that this process often brings forth a mouse, but
in addition to the important declarations mentioned previously, this
method has resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of
hundreds of resolutions and lately has become the favorite tool of
the Security Council. 9 Consensus is more a political than a legal
concept; decisions arrived at by consensus have a stronger moral
force and their execution is thereby facilitated.'" Sometimes, how-
ever, grave difficulties arise. For instance, in the law of the sea
negotiations a variation of this procedure has resulted by now in
general acceptance of more than 300 articles; but, because of an
aberration in the negotiating process an agreement on the remain-
der of the text was aborted at the last minute of the sixth session."
In a way, over the years the pendulum has swung back from a
process where a general consensus was required for the creation of
a rule of international customary law and unanimity was required
at international conferences, through a period of experimentation
with various majority rules, back to consensus in the new quasi-
legislative process. 2 The new law, in order to be accepted by the
nations of the world, must reflect the common opinion of mankind;
and this is as it should be. It may not be really instant law, but in
the long run this method is better and safer. A legal system thus
shaped is likely to endure and to become, as it is said on the Great
Seal of the United States, a new order of the ages, Novus Ordo
Seclorum, or-in Dean Rusk's phrase-"a decent world order."
" For a similar analysis of the road to consensus, see Tammes, Decisions of International
.Organs as a Source of International Law, 94 ACAD9MIE DE DROIT INT'L, RECUEIL DES COURS 261,
287 (1958).
11 For an analysis of the methods of adoption of General Assembly resolutions, see Sohn,
United Nations Decision-Making: Confrontation or Consensus? 15 HARV. INT'L L. J. 438-45
(1974). See also Cassan, Le consensus dans la pratique des Nations Unies, 20 ANNUAIRE
FRANqAIS DE DRorr INT'L 456-85 (1974); Cassese, Consensus and Some of Its Pitfalls, 58 RIVISTA
Di DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 754-61 (1975); CHAI, CONSULTATION AND CONSENSUS IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL (1971); Jessup, Silence Gives Consent, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 46-54 (1973).
10 2 H.G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 328 (1972).
"1 See Statement by U.S. Ambassador, Elliot L. Richardson, July 20, 1977, supra note 37.
92 Sohn, Voting Procedures in United Nations Conferences for the Codification of Interna-
tional Law, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 310-53 (1975).
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